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1. Introduction 
 The economic globalization that has come to characterize the 21st century poses 
significant challenges to the “Westphalian paradigm of human rights protection under national-
constitutional and international law”, which allocates human rights obligations within the locus 
of sovereign states (Augenstein and Kinley 2013, 271). Patterns of production, cooperation, and 
competition across national borders are creating governance gaps between “the increased scope 
and impact of economic forces and the capacities of societies and governments to manage their 
adverse consequences” (HRC 2008, 3). Accordingly, the traditional emphasis of the human 
rights discourse on protecting individuals from the oppressive power of the state is increasingly 
shifting to large economic actors, specifically transnational corporations (TNCs). Indeed, 
violations of human rights by economic actors operating abroad have become more frequent and 
increasing documentation of the negative effects of global business operations on human rights 
has triggered ‘business and human rights debates’ in major international fora. Many of these 
debates revolve around a central question: who is to be held responsible for human rights 
violations in global business operations? 
 Transnational production processes are characterized by the involvement of a myriad of 
actors including states, TNCs and local production facilities, making it difficult to assign 
responsibility for human rights harm. Recognizing this accountability gap, the UN has 
undertaken several attempts since the 1970s to draft effective legislation to address it. After 
rejecting many proposals, the Human Rights Council (HRC) accepted the ‘UN Protect, Respect, 
and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (Framework) in 2008. The framework 
constitutes the UNs first formal response on the issues of corporate-related human rights harm 
and aims to clarify the responsibilities of relevant actors by addressing the “governance gaps 
created by globalization” to promote a more effective “protection of individuals and 
communities against corporate-related human rights harm” (HRC 2008, 3). It does so by 
proposing three complementary pillars: 1) “the state duty to protect against human rights abuses 
by third parties, including business”; 2) “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights”; 
and 3) the accessibility of effective remedies for victims (Ibid.). The Framework was further 
operationalized in the following years, resulting in the publication of the ‘UN Guiding Principles 
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on Business and Human Rights’ (UNGPs) in 2011 and several interpretive guides for businesses 
and states.  
Both the Framework and UNGPs indicate the host state1 as the sole actor to which legal 
duties are assigned. Businesses are assigned responsibilities without any necessary legal 
repercussions, which they can discharge through due diligence. Considering the state’s duty to 
protect, adequate state capacity appears to be crucial for the effectiveness of the UNGPs. 
However, businesses also operate in states where the government is either unwilling or unable to 
fulfil its protective duties, such as in the context of conflict, repression or limited state control 
and/or capacity. This thesis is concerned with determining the effectiveness of the UNGPs in 
these contexts by asking the following question: when the host state is either unwilling or unable 
to fulfil its duty to protect against human rights abuses, do the UNGPs offer sufficient alternative 
mechanisms to ensure that violations corporate actors do not occur?  
Since the introduction of the UNGPs, the question of whether home states and 
corporations can be ascribed legal obligations has been subject to much research and debate by 
scholars.2 What has received less consideration, however, is whether they have sufficient 
incentives to act and what their conduct is in practice. Whilst there has been a multitude of 
studies into the legal and normative foundations of the UNGPs, case studies of their actual 
effects on the conduct of states and businesses remain few.3 This thesis addresses both of these 
gaps by inquiring into the obligations and/or incentives home states and corporations have to 
prevent and redress corporate-related abuses in circumstances where the host country of 
transnational production is unable or unwilling to comply with its duty to protect, and how these 
are applied in practice. Through analyses of the ways TNCs in the garment sector and their home 
states do or do not incorporate the UNGPs recommendations that aim to compensate for a lack of 
host state action, this thesis aims to gain more insight into whether the UNGPs sufficiently 
incentivise these actors to take additional action in those contexts where human rights are 
arguably most at risk. 
                                               
1  Within the context of the UNGPs, the term ‘host state’ is used to indicate the country in which production by a 
TNC takes place. ‘Home state’ refers to the country in which that TNC is domiciled. 
2 See, for example, Augenstein and Kinley 2013, Artacho and Del Mar 2013, Davitti 2016, Bernaz 2013, and 
Methven O’Brien 2018. 
3 With the notable exception of Halversson and Buhman 2013, who include four case studies in their discussion on 
extraterritorial regulation of companies under the UNGPs. 
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1.1. Garment sector in Myanmar 
To facilitate comparison between TNCs, this thesis focuses on garment sector companies 
that operate in Myanmar. Myanmar has suffered decades of authoritarian rule, self-isolation, and 
one of the world’s longest protracted civil wars. Since 2010, a military-led transition to a quasi-
democratic rule has seemingly put the country on the path towards a ‘modern’ democratic state. 
Following this transition, most economic sanctions on Myanmar were lifted in 2012, leading to 
an influx of foreign investment. The low wages and relaxed regulatory environment made 
Myanmar very attractive for businesses in labour-intensive, low-skilled sectors, most notably the 
garment sector.  The ASEAN Post has reported that Myanmar’s garment exports rose from 
US$349 million in 2010 to US$4.6 billion in 2018, constituting around 10 percent of the 
country’s total export revenues (The ASEAN post 2018). 
While there are many reasons to be optimistic about Myanmar’s future as a growing 
market, the country also faces serious challenges. The country remains plagued by armed 
struggles between the army and ethnic minorities, the military still holds considerable power, 
and, resulting from decades of authoritarian and colonial rule, many institutions and the 
government itself are weak or ineffective. Myanmar struggles with rampant corruption, limited 
institutional capacity to carry out policy, and lack of rule of law. The government and judicial 
system lack accountability for human rights violations and fail to provide access to remedy for 
victims of human rights abuses (ITUC 2015, 13). Although the government has established a 
Myanmar National Human Rights Commission and a number of parliamentary bodies to handle 
human rights complaints, “these bodies lack real powers to solve disputes and have proven 
ineffective”, the International Trade Union Confederation concludes (Ibid.). Human rights 
defenders and CSOs are still being arrested and charged for peaceful activities as the freedoms of 
expression and assembly are heavily repressed (World Justice Project 2020). 
Myanmar’s transitional juncture poses risks for TNCs, as liberalising a complex political 
economy that is shaped by a legacy of repression, ethnic conflict, and colonialism can create a 
volatile, politically complex context in which human rights violations might more frequently 
occur. TNCs operating there may risk contributing or being directly linked through their 
operations or relations to violations of human rights. Myanmar’s garment sector specifically has 
been internationally criticized for numerous human rights violations, including forced unpaid 
overtime, child labour, hazardous working conditions, and denial of breaks (Thews and Overeem 
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2017; Fair Wear Foundation 2016). NGOs and CSOs have warned that human rights violations 
in the sector are exacerbated by the fluctuating legitimacy and effectiveness of state power, 
immature legal system and widespread corruption in the country.4  
Myanmar offers a unique case study by which to examine the efficaciousness of the 
Framework and UNGPs in reducing corporate-related human rights harm in the context of 
limited host state willingness and/or capacity to fulfil its duty to protect. As it has only become 
possible for garment TNCs to source from Myanmar after 2012, hence after the implementation 
of the UNGPs, all current transnational activities in the Myanmar garment industry have been set 
up whilst the UNGPs were in place. This allows for an assessment of how the guidelines have 
impacted home state and business conduct at various stages. 
1.2. Outline 
This thesis is structured as follows. The next section introduces the contents of the 
Framework and UNGP and reviews the scholarly literature regarding duties and incentives for 
home states and corporations in conflict contexts. Section three sets out the methodology for this 
thesis, which is centred on analysing home state commitments, as expressed in a state’s National 
Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (NAP), and company commitments, as expressed in 
their human rights policies and reports. Section four presents a summary of state commitment 
trends regarding business and human rights in conflict-affected areas and severe abuses, 
identified through researching state NAPs. Section five presents a similar analysis for TNC 
commitments, identified through researching their human rights policies and reports. The sixth 
and final section offers concluding remarks and recommendations for further research. 
Through an analysis of home state and TNC commitments in Myanmar, this thesis 
concludes that the UNGPs do not sufficiently incentivise either to fully incorporate the UNGPs 
recommendations aimed at compensating for insufficient host state action. Home states remain 
reluctant to regulate their companies abroad and often refrain from making commitments to 
which they can be held accountable. TNCs are insufficiently transparent about their human rights 
conduct, thereby restricting the ability of consumers and CSOs to hold them accountable.   
 
                                               
4 For a thorough analysis of the political climate in Myanmar and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state, see 
Egreteau and Mangan 2018. 
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2. Content of the Framework and UNGPs 
The Framework and its operationalisation in the UNGPs aim to provide more effective 
protection to individuals and communities against corporate-related human rights harm by 
addressing the governance gaps created by globalization (HRC 2008, 3). Globalization and the 
increasingly transnational nature of production processes have, it is argued, made it increasingly 
difficult to assign responsibility for human rights harm. The Framework and UNGPs are not 
presented as a new set of international laws but as practical recommendations that elaborate on 
the implications of existing international obligation for governments and businesses involved in 
transnational production processes. The Framework and UNGPs clarify the duties and 
responsibilities of states and corporations in preventing human rights harm and providing 
remedies by specifying three pillars: the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to 
respect, and access to remedies. 
2.1. Pillar 1: The State Duty to Protect 
 The state duty to protect lies at the core of the international human rights regime and 
underscores the overall role of the state as a duty bearer. Drawing on international human rights 
law, the UNGPs reinforce the state’s duty to “respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of 
individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction” and remind states that “this includes the 
duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises” (UN 
2011, 3). With respect to protecting citizens from corporate-related human rights abuses, the 
UNGPs require states to fulfil their duty to respect through enforcing and, where needed, 
updating or introducing effective legislation and providing guidance to business enterprises on 
how to respect human rights throughout their operations (UN 2011, 4).  
While the UNGPs encourage governments to provide effective guidance to companies on 
ensuring human rights compliance throughout their operations, states are not automatically held 
responsible for the corporate-related human rights abuses within their territory. Nevertheless, 
states may be in breach of their international human rights obligations where such abuse can be 
attributed to them or when they have failed to take the appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, 
punish, and redress corporate related human rights harm through effective policies, legislation, 
and regulations (UN 2011, 4-12). 
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Whereas businesses are merely required to ‘respect’ human rights, governments have an 
obligation to protect human rights within their territory. However, there may be circumstances in 
which the host state is either unable or unwilling to fulfil its duty to protect. Principle 7 
recognizes this and supporting business respect for human rights in “conflict-affected areas” in 
detail. Before we consider the contents of principle 7 in more depth, it is necessary we first 
examine the central concept on which it is built: conflict-affected areas. 
While the term ‘conflict-affected areas’ is the central focus of principle 7, the UNGPs do 
not offer a definition or further clarification of what this would and would not include. The term 
might be kept deliberately vague, Rudu Mares (2014) argues, because it allows for an expansion 
of the coverage of principle 7 beyond its traditional definition as active armed conflict in 
international humanitarian law (Mares 2014). Rather than focussing on defining conflict, both 
the UNGPs and the additional report on their implementation in conflict-affected areas focus 
predominantly on the heightened risk of abuse, the increased probable severity and the inability 
of the host state to interfere effectively. Consider the following: 
 
“Some of the worst human rights involving business occur amid conflict over the control 
over territory, resources or a Government itself - where the human rights regime cannot 
be expected to function as intended” (UN 2011, principle 7). 
 
Further, 
 
“The risks of involvement in gross human rights abuse tend to be most prevalent in 
contexts where there are no effective government institutions and legal protection or 
where there are entrenched patterns of severe discrimination. Perhaps the greatest risks 
arise in conflict-affected areas, though they are not limited to such regions”. 
(Interpretative Guide, 80) 
 
The guidance of principle 7 can thus not be limited to regions with active conflict as its 
emphasis is predominantly on increased risks of more severe abuses and improper functioning of 
the human rights regime. Although it cannot be refuted that areas with active armed conflict are 
at heightened risk for more severe abuses, Mares compellingly argues that the UNGPs offer no 
satisfactory justification for focussing on such areas only as gross violations of human rights also 
regularly occur in absence of active armed conflict, such as in repressive states and dictatorships 
(Mares 2014, 299).    
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By keeping the term ‘conflict-affected areas’ undefined and emphasizing the severity of 
violations and lack of effective government intervention, the UNGPs offer no justification for 
limiting the guidance of principle 7 to situations with active armed conflict only. For the 
interpretation of principle 7, I therefore follow Mares’ argument that its guidance is applicable to 
heightened risk of severe abuses in all settings irrespectively of the types of conflict, or even in 
the absence of conflict altogether, as the emphasis is mainly on the heightened risk of severe 
abuses and lack of effective intervention by the host state (Mares 2014, 315).  
Returning to the contents of principle 7, which recognizes the particularly important 
challenges to ensuring respect for human rights by businesses in conflict-affected areas and asks 
states to take enhanced, context-specific measures to address the heightened risk of adverse 
human rights impacts (UN Working Group 2016, 26). It also recognizes that the host state may 
be “unable to protect human rights adequately due to a lack of effective control” (Ibid.). As the 
UNGPs rely heavily on the host state as the main duty bearer, an inability of the host state to 
fulfil its duties would significantly limit its application in unstable environments, where human 
rights are arguably most at risk. To fill this governance gap, the UNGPs call on home states to 
“assist both corporations and the host state to ensure that businesses are not involved with human 
rights abuse” (UN 2011, principle 7).   
Principle 7 thus shines a spotlight on the role of home states in ensuring that the corporate 
responsibility to respect is fulfilled in conflict zones. To this end, it makes four concrete 
recommendations. It is specified that both host and home states should: 
 
a) Engage at the earliest stage possible with business enterprises to help them 
identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their activities and 
business relationships; 
b) Provide adequate assistance to business enterprises to assess and address the 
heightened risks of abuses, paying special attention to both gender-based and 
sexual violence; 
c) Deny access to public support and services for a business enterprise that is 
involved with gross human rights abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing 
the situation; 
d) Ensure that their current policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement 
measures are effective in addressing the risk of business involvement in gross 
human rights abuses. (UN 2011, principle 7) 
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The UNGPs further stress that home state’s governmental bodies, such as embassies, trade 
agencies, and other state agencies that link directly to businesses in the field play a key role in 
fulfilling the responsibilities of home states in conflict-affected areas. If corporate violations of 
human rights do occur, home states “may explore civil, administrative or criminal liability for 
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction” (UN 2011, principle 7, emphasis 
added).  
 It is important to note here that, whereas host states have explicit duties to ensure human 
rights protection within their territories, home states are not assigned extraterritorial obligations.5 
While the topic of whether home states can be assigned extraterritorial obligations to protect 
human rights has received considerable attention from scholars6, this will not be the focus of this 
study. It suffices to say that the UNGPs recognize that experts disagree on whether states have 
obligations under international law to help prevent human rights abuses by companies domiciled 
within their territory, but note that there is a greater consensus that those states are neither 
prohibited nor required to do so. The UNGPs thus explicitly do not include extraterritorial 
obligations for home states but rather state that home states are, under international human rights 
law, generally permitted to take more extensive action to regulate overseas activities by 
companies based in their territories but cannot be required to do so (UN 2011, 4).  
The non-obligatory nature of principle 7 for home states generates the question whether it 
effectively prompts home states into action in areas where there is a heightened risk of gross 
abuse by ‘their’ companies?  
2.1.1. Obligations and incentives for home states 
Previously, I demonstrated that home states do not have legal duties within the UNGPs 
but are strongly encouraged to support host states in ensuring businesses respect human rights 
throughout their operations, especially in conditions where severe abuses are more likely and 
host states have limited willingness or capacity to fulfil their duty to protect. The lack of explicit 
                                               
5 The extraterritorial dimension of the duty to protect imposes an obligation to protect individuals abroad from 
human rights violations that can be attributed to third parties over which the state has jurisdiction. This implies, for 
example, the duty of a home state to regulate national companies to ensure that they do not infringe on human rights 
in the countries where they operate. 
6 Scholars are divided on whether home states do or do not have extraterritorial obligations under international law. 
For a discussion on why states do have extraterritorial obligations, see: Davitti 2016, Augenstein and Kinley 2013 
and Artache and Del Mar 2013. For a discussion on why states cannot be ascribed extraterritorial obligations, see: 
Bernaz 2013 and Methven O’Brien 2018  
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obligations for home states has received widespread criticism from scholars, as it arguably leaves 
to the home states’ discretion whether or not to regulate their TNCs conduct abroad. Augenstein 
and Kinley (2013) have argued that by marginalizing extraterritorial prescription in favour of 
permission, the UNGPs have “detrimental consequences” for the extraterritorial protection of 
human rights obligations (Augenstein and Kinley 2013, 279). Although legally permitted, 
Augenstein and Kinley have argued, home states remain reluctant to regulate and control 
national corporations abroad for two reasons: to the need to maintain a ‘level playing field’ for 
national corporations and to avoid conflicting with the legal sovereignty principle and political 
and economic interests of host states (Ibid.). Such an argument is supported by Halversson and 
Buhman (2013), Backer (2012) and Knox (2012) and highlights a potential key weakness of the 
UNGPs: home states face a variety of disincentives to act extraterritorially, even in contexts with 
heightened risks of severe abuse. To assess whether the constraints of home states are addressed 
appropriately in the UNGPs, both aforementioned constraints are considered in more detail 
below. 
Although several scholars (Augenstein and Kinley 2013; Halversson and Buhman 2013) 
explicitly mention that the economic interest of the home state can disincentive states to regulate 
their corporations extraterritorially, the topic receives little in-depth scholarly consideration. 
Nevertheless, it is an important point to consider here. States that regulate their TNCs abroad 
extensively may undercut their competitiveness compared to those domiciled in states that do 
not. The result is a prisoner’s dilemma in which the choices made individually by each state may 
be less optimal than if states were to cooperate in controlling transnational corporations. The UN 
Human Rights Council (HRC) has recognized that states are more inclined to adopt policies that 
do not put their own businesses at an unfair disadvantage and, to resolve this, recommends states 
to engage in multilateral standard-setting (HRC 2011, 7). Although this could potentially resolve 
this dilemma, this has proven difficult to realise in practice.  
Regarding the sovereignty and interference issue, exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
indeed necessarily paired with some degree of incursion into the domestic affairs of the home 
state. Olivier de Schutter (2006), one of the most well-known advocates for extraterritorial 
human rights duties, also recognized potential state objections, explaining that “in general, it may 
be anticipated that control by home states of the activities of transnational corporations will be 
resented as a limitation to the sovereign right of the territorial states concerned to regulate 
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activities occurring in their territory, as portraying a distrust of the ability of those states to 
effectively protect their own populations from the activities of foreign corporations” (De 
Schutter 2006, 21). Rachel Chambers (2018) too highlights that exercising extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is potentially problematic as it can be viewed as an impermissible infringement of 
host state exclusive jurisdiction or as imperialist and/or neo-colonialist (Chambers 2018, 2). 
Indeed, home state interference may conflict with the interests of the host state government and 
cause tension in the relationship. For instance, extraterritorial labour protection policies 
implemented by the home state may conflict with host state strategies when it employs cheap 
labour as an incentive for foreign investment. In this case, home state policies can have a direct 
influence on business activity and economic prosperity in the host country. In the context of 
conflict or repressive politics, host states may be particularly likely to object to extraterritorial 
incursions due to political considerations or to avoid attention being focussed on the 
government’s role in, and possible benefit from, corporate-related abuses.  
When the host state objects to extraterritorial actions, Chambers argues, this may present 
home states a moral dilemma: limiting their regulations and adjudications to events and actors 
wholly within their territorial state creates governance gaps where corporate misconduct is 
transnational, spanning both home and host state, or where the host state is unwilling or unable to 
regulate the locally incorporated subsidiary or other affiliate company, while acting 
extraterritorially can have detrimental political consequences (Chambers 2018, 2). Chambers’ 
‘dilemma’ draws attention to how home states aim to balance the political gains and losses of 
drafting and enforcing extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, Chambers fails to take into account 
how other factors, such as loss of revenue for their national companies, may also disincentive 
host states from interfering in their businesses’ operations abroad and overemphasizes the 
objections of host states. 
In sum, the Framework and UNGPs do not generate extraterritorial obligations for states. 
Home states are not held liable for failing to act extraterritorial in the case of gross violations or 
high-risk contexts, but are encouraged to take addition actions and the UNGPs provide ample 
guidance for this. Nevertheless, states face multiple disincentives for regulating their TNCs 
conduct abroad, which are not adequately addressed. If the UNGPs aim to address the 
governance gaps created by globalization, the omission of clear obligations or incentives for 
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home states constitutes a weakness, leaving many governance gaps unresolved when host states 
do not fulfil their duties. 
2.2. Pillar 2: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
There are few, if any, internationally recognized rights that corporations cannot impact 
through their operations. While the Framework and UNGPs assert that companies should 
“consider” all those rights, they do not impose direct legal obligations on business enterprises 
(HRC 2009, 15). The responsibility to respect, as articulated in the Framework and UNGPs, can 
be considered a universal voluntary commitment towards promoting more effective protection of 
individuals and communities against corporate-related human rights harm. Corporations should 
respect human rights by avoiding infringement on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse impacts in which they are involved (UN 2011, 13). Despite its voluntary nature, the 
UNGPs lay down a basis for social corporate responsibility to prevent human rights abuses in the 
corporate sphere.  
The UNGPs and the Interpretive Guide to the Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
(Interpretive Guide) indicate that a company can be involved in human rights harm by 1) causing 
the impact through its activities; 2) contributing to the impact through its own activities or 
through another entity; or 3) neither causing or contributing to the impact, but appear as its 
direct perpetrator, the accomplice or beneficiary (UN 2012, 15). This implies that corporations 
can also be held responsible for adverse human rights impacts through, for example, their 
suppliers or business partners.  
The UNGPs stipulate both preventive and remediation human rights measures through 
due diligence, referring to the “steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and 
address adverse human rights impacts” (UN 2011, principle 17). Putting due diligence into 
practice requires the adoption of a human rights policy and its integration in all layers of the 
corporation, as well as assessment of these policies’ impact and the tracking of overall human 
rights performance. Remediation is expected in response to harm and includes ceasing all 
harmful activities, terminating all contributions to or trading relationships with irresponsible 
(sub)contractors and exercising “leverage” over affiliates who infringe on rights (UN 2011, 
principle 19). 
  
12 
 
For businesses operating in “conflict-affected areas” the UNGPs make a number of 
additional recommendations which can be categorized into those relating to 1) assessing impacts; 
2) integrating findings and taking action; 3) remediation; and 4) formal reporting and 
transparency.  Firstly, businesses operating in volatile contexts should become aware of any 
heightened human rights risks the operating environment might pose and ensure their processes 
are “proportionate to the human rights risks of its operations” (UN 2012, 19; UN 2011, 
principles 14, 17 and 18). Principle 17 emphasizes that the risk assessment will “vary in 
complexity with the size of business enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts, and the 
nature and context of its operations” and that businesses should prioritize those areas where risks 
are most significant (UN 2011, principle 17). The Interpretative Guide specifies that businesses 
can identify heightened risks by conducting country-specific human rights assessments prior to 
starting operations and conducting repeat assessments if the context changes (UN 2012, 34).  
Secondly, the UNGPs recommend companies to integrate findings from these 
assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take appropriate action to 
mitigate risks (UN 2011, principle 19). Companies can use leverage to mitigate human rights 
issues and should take into account the possible severity of violations. The more severe 
(possible) violations, “the more quickly the enterprise will need to see change before it takes a 
decision on whether it should end the relationship” (Ibid.). 
Thirdly, in the event that a violation does occur companies should provide effective and 
legitimate remedies. When violations occur in conflict-affected areas, companies are advised to 
engage stakeholders and independent experts to ensure their response does not exacerbate the 
situation and, where necessary, prioritize actions according to severity as a delayed response may 
affect remediability (UN 2011, principles 23 and 24).  
Lastly, businesses who face heightened human rights risks in their operating contexts are 
advised to formally report on how they address these (UN 2011, principle 21). Formal reports 
may be self-standing reports on the enterprise’s human rights performance, or be part of wider 
reports on non-financial performance. For retail companies, who often source through long and 
complex supply chains, the interpretative guide recommends they should “communicate on how 
they address potential and actual human rights abuses in the supply chain” (UN 2012, 58). 
All recommendations for businesses in the Framework and the UN 2011, including those 
for conflict-affected areas, are non-binding and voluntary in nature. Rather than threatening legal 
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enforcement, the UNGPs place business responsibility, driven by social expectations, at the 
centre of the policy and practice of corporate-related human rights harm. By demonstrating 
compliance with international human rights norms businesses can gain a ‘social license to 
operate’ while failing to fulfil responsibilities can have negative legal, financial and reputational 
consequences (UN 2012, 13-14). The proposed due diligence assessments for human rights risks 
are intended to provide businesses with the empirical information necessary to reconcile the 
market-driven demands of doing business with the social expectations driving the demands for 
respecting human rights. Although the term ‘due diligence’ evokes a legal standard, within the 
UNGPs it is fundamentally a term that refers to a series of good practices without necessary legal 
implications.  
 Generally speaking, businesses are not ascribed legal obligations under the UNGPs. 
Nevertheless, as Nicola Jägers (2013) argues, by itself the non-legal nature of the responsibility 
to respect does not justify dismissing it as merely aspirational and consequently of little use in 
the quest for corporate accountability (Jägers 2013, 299). Jägers argues that although the 
adoption of measures to discharge the responsibility to respect are (initially) voluntary in nature, 
they are “not without teeth” as compliance with these measures is increasingly mandatory. 
Through domestic legislation and private law stakeholders could, arguably, harden voluntary 
commitment (Ibid.). This is echoed in the Interpretive Guide, which states that domestic laws or 
regulations corresponding to international human rights standards reflect “at least in part” the 
responsibility to respect (UN 2012, 13).  
 Although governments can indeed harden responsibilities through domestic legislation, 
the final responsibility to enforce compliance remains with states who might be unwilling or 
unable to fulfil their duties or, in the case of home states, are not under an obligation to act at all. 
This is likely to be particularly problematic in the context of state repression, conflict, limited 
state capacity or instances where the state itself benefits from human rights abuse. Neither Jägers 
nor the UNGPs and Interpretative Guide sufficiently acknowledge how an incapable or non-
compliant host state may fail to provide the regulatory framework to prevent abuses and may, on 
the contrary, even enable, encourage or force businesses to commit human rights abuses. To 
assess the effectiveness of the UNGPs in such situations, we must consider the ways businesses 
can be involved in abuses in conflict-affected areas and the incentives they have to prevent and 
redress these. 
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2.2.1. Incentives and obligations for corporations 
The Interpretive Guide states that businesses should be extra vigilant in contexts where 
there are no effective government institutions and legal protection, which may or may not be 
conflict-affected areas. Such contexts should “automatically raise red flags within enterprises and 
trigger human rights due diligence processes that are finely tuned and sensitive to this higher 
level of risk” (Interpretive Guide, question 85). It is important to note here that, even in high-risk 
contexts, the corporate responsibility to respect does not expand to include ‘protect’ or ‘fulfil’ 
elements. The UN working group chose this stance because broadening the responsibility to 
respect, even in exceptional cases, would logically lead to a breaking point: corporations staying 
away from conflict zones altogether. As corporations also make positive contributions, this was 
considered an unwanted consequence. 
Although businesses cannot be held liable in most circumstances, committing or 
complicity in the most severe human rights violations that amount to crimes against humanity or 
war crimes, such as genocide, slavery, torture, and human trafficking may generate legal liability 
as international standards and national law have increasingly evolved to sanction these most 
heinous of crimes. This is emphasized in the commentary of principle 23 of the UNGPs: 
 
Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may increase the risk of 
enterprises being complicit in gross human rights abuses committed by other actors 
(security forces, for example). Business enterprises should treat this risk as a legal 
compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate legal liability arising 
from extraterritorial civil claims, and the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide for corporate 
criminal responsibility. (UN 2011, principle 23, emphasis added) 
 
 
There must be some nuance to the applicability of such provisions to corporations, 
however, as John Knox (2012) points out. The sources of international law that the UNGPs cite 
for the existence of prohibitions on international crimes do not explicitly refer to corporations, 
and some even explicitly limit their coverage to individuals (Knox 2012, 70). Although a 
growing number of cases contributes to an emerging norm that corporations can and should be 
held liable for violations of international criminal law, research has indicated that very few 
companies actually end up in court or with a verdict (Enneking et al 2015). Therefore the 
UNGPs’ description of the trend towards greater potential liability for corporations seems more 
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likely to, Knox argues, “have the aim and effect of raising awareness of the practical 
consequences of this trend” (Knox 2012, 74, emphasis added). Indeed, the UNGPs’ overarching 
point should be interpreted as a warning for corporations that the potential legal costs of 
behaviour resulting in accusations of violations of these standards are high. 
This is emblematic of the UNGPs’ stance towards business responsibility in general. 
Because the responsibility to protect generally cannot be enforced at the international level, the 
UNGPs mainly emphasize the potential reputational and legal costs of noncompliance with 
human rights norms. They emphasize that the public, consumers especially, can hold businesses 
accountable for their actions. Failing to respect human rights may damage their reputation, 
thereby reducing incomes from sales and hampering their ability to recruit and retain staff and to 
gain permits, investments and new project opportunities. As such, the UNGPs argue, it is in the 
business’ best interest to comply with the guidelines. The success or failure of the UNGPs in 
persuading corporations to respect human rights is therefore essentially tied to whether the courts 
of public opinion can use their naming and shaming power effectively. 
Sally Wheeler (2015) addresses some critical issues with this emphasis on public scrutiny 
and reputation. Firstly, not all corporations will react in the same way to pressure from the 
public. Reputation has a different value to different corporations and a corporation's internal 
operational culture highly determines how external pressure affects its actions (Wheeler 2015, 
766). Moreover, it is not guaranteed that news of corporate-related human rights harm will 
always reach consumers or civil society organisations, especially in repressive environments. 
When transnational supply chains are long and largely invisible to consumers, as is the case in 
the global garment industry for example, this introduces additional problems. How can we 
expect consumers and civil society to hold companies accountable for human rights abuses if 
these production processes are not transparent? Although the public debate on human rights 
violations in the fashion industry has been gaining traction the last few years, it remains 
questionable up to what extent consumers are actually informed about the circumstances in 
which their clothing was produced and up to what extent they alter their purchasing decisions 
accordingly. 
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2.3. Pillar 3: Access to Remedies 
The state duty to protect and corporate responsibility to respect are supplemented by the 
need to provide effective remedies for adverse human rights impacts by corporations. Both states 
and corporations are assigned roles under the third pillar. Corporations should ensure access to 
remedies by providing effective claim mechanisms at an operational level, install due diligence 
mechanisms that identify and address grievances early and “provide for or cooperate in their 
remediation through legitimate processes” (UN 2011, principle 22). 
 States are expected to investigate and punish business-related human rights abuses and 
offer remedies to those affected within their territory and/or jurisdiction. Judicial and non-
judicial instruments must ensure that redress actions contemplate all or some of the following: 
“compensation, restitution, guarantees of non-repetition, changes in relevant law, or public 
apologies” (HRC 2008, 22). States are advised to strengthen their judicial mechanisms to 
overcome barriers that could result in denial of access to remedy. These barriers include the 
corporate misuse of separate legal personalities, high litigation costs, and lack of legal 
representation (UN 2011, principle 26).  
Principle 25 and 26 further underscore the importance of ensuring access to remedies in 
conflict-affected areas. Principle 25 stipulates that states must ensure access to effective remedy 
through ”judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means” while principle 26 
specifies that home states should ensure access to judicial mechanisms when there is a “denial of 
justice in the host state” (UN 2011, principle 25 and 26). In the context of conflict, citizens in 
many fragile or repressive countries experience difficulties in accessing justice and remedy 
mechanisms, which underscores, CSO CIDSE argues, “the need for effective extraterritorial 
action by States where multinational companies are based” (CIDSE 2014, 1) 
In addition to its obvious qualities of holding companies accountable for actions 
committed and redressing adverse impacts for victims, remedial action provides an option for 
what may be referred to as “ex post” regulation. Judicial and non-judicial remediation 
mechanisms can be “a source of continuous learning” as both companies and states can learn and 
draw lessons from how cases are handled to “improve the mechanisms and prevent future 
grievances and harms” (UN 2011, p.31). 
  
17 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
 The three pillars of the Framework and UNGPs are presented as mutually supportive and 
reinforcing. Arguably, as states exercise their duty to protect they would ensure, through 
regulation or otherwise, that businesses respect human rights as defined in the second pillar. In 
the Framework this is explained as follows: 
 
In addition to compliance with national laws, the baseline responsibility of companies is 
to respect human rights (...). Whereas governments define the scope of legal compliance, 
the broader scope of the responsibility to respect is defined by social expectation - as part 
of what is sometimes called a company’s license to operate. (HRC 2008, 16-17)  
 
The duties and responsibilities of the states and businesses thus intersect in the realm of domestic 
legislature where states can define the scope of legal compliance and enforce adherence to 
human rights norms. As such, the state in which production takes place, as the only actor to 
which clear duties are prescribed, carries the main responsibility to protect individuals from 
corporate-related human rights abuses.  
The Framework and UNGPs provide insufficient guidance on what the implications are 
for other actors in the system when the host state is either unwilling or unable to fulfil these 
duties and, therefore, leaves many of the governance gaps created by globalization unresolved. 
Although it encourages home states and corporations to take extra actions in such contexts, the 
previous discussion has illustrated that neither the home state nor the corporation have any 
obligations and that there are serious limitations to their incentives to do so. It therefore remains 
questionable whether the UNGPs are effective in ensuring alternative mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights when the host state is unwilling or unable to perform its duty to 
protect.  
Scholarly debate up to this moment has predominantly focussed on the theoretical, legal 
aspects of the Framework and UNGPs. Although this has provided valuable insights and 
guidance for states and businesses, there has been little research on how home states and TNCs 
who operate in conflict-affected areas implement the recommendation that the UNGPs make. 
This thesis addresses that gap through an analysis of the ways TNCs in Myanmar’s garment 
sector and their home states do or do not incorporate the UNGPs recommendations regarding 
lack of home state action and heightened risk, and aims to gain more insight into whether the 
  
18 
 
UNGPs sufficiently incentivise TNCs and home states to take additional action in these contexts 
where human rights are particularly vulnerable.   
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Case selection and sources 
  This thesis considers the human rights commitments of garment TNCs and their home 
states in Myanmar.  Following concerns over corporate-related human rights abuses in Myanmar, 
the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s (BHRRC) set up a project to track foreign 
investment in Myanmar in 2014. This project aims to create a public database on foreign 
companies investing in Myanmar and their human rights commitments. BHRRC asked 10 
garment TNCs investing in Myanmar to disclose information on the nature of their investment in 
Myanmar, whether they have policies and procedures in place to prevent contributing to human 
rights abuse through their operations, and whether they have consulted with workers and unions 
in carrying out due diligence. Company responses and non-responses to this questionnaire were 
published publicly. Since the questionnaire, the BHRRC has continued to follow up with these 
companies about developments in Myanmar such as the introduction of a new minimum wage or 
allegations of human rights violations.7 
 While this project provides a good starting point for analysing corporate human rights 
commitments in Myanmar and provides valuable information on country-specific actions and 
policies, its scope and depth remained quite limited since the BHRRC did not include analyses of 
other company resources. Moreover, as the business and human rights dilemma exist on the 
state-business nexus, an inclusion of the state perspective is critical for a full comprehension of 
the effects the UNGPs implementation has had on business activity in crisis-affected areas. The 
project by the BHRRC does not include such a state perspective.  
This thesis builds on the work by the BHRRC by analysing companies’ public 
disclosures on human rights and home states NAPs. The research in this thesis is exclusively 
desk-based, using information publicly reported by the companies and states in the sample. 
Resources include CSR reports, codes of conduct, supplier policies and other information 
disclosed on the company websites referring to human rights commitments (e.g. policies, internal 
                                               
7
  For more information on the project see https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/myanmar-foreign-investment-tracking-
project-launch  
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documents, special human rights reports, etc.). As this research is based purely on information 
publicly disclosed by the companies and states in the sample group, findings are focused on 
disclosure practices and should not be taken as a judgement to actual practices, which may 
include a range of policies, processes and outcomes that are not reflected in disclosure. Equally, 
it is recognized that third parties may in some cases contest information disclosed about 
corporate practices. 
 To facilitate comparison and include state commitment in my analysis, I have selected 
those companies of which the home state has published a NAP. NAPs are policy documents in 
which a government articulates the priorities and actions it will adopt to support the 
implementation of the UNGPs at a national level and with regards to companies that are 
domiciled within its territory. As such, a NAP communicates a state’s baseline commitment to 
business and human rights. The UN Working Group, mandated by the HRC to promote the 
effective and comprehensive implementation of the UNGPs, noted in its 2016 report Guidance 
on Business and Human Rights NAPs that NAPs can be an important means to promote the 
implementation of the UNGPs and recommended all states to develop a NAP (UN Working 
Group 2016, 1). From the 10 garment sector companies in the BHRRC survey, 9 are based in 
countries that have published a NAP. These companies are domiciled in 6 countries. The 
research sample in this thesis thus consists of 9 company and 6 state cases. 
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Companies States 
Jack Wolfskin Germany 
Adidas 
Mango Spain 
Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) Sweden 
MC Group Thailand 
Primark United Kingdom 
Marks & Spencer 
Calvin Klein United States 
GAP 
Table 1: companies and states selected for this study 
3.2 Analysis 
 As previously discussed, the UNGPs recommend policies for both companies and home 
states to offset negative consequences of inadequate home state action for the prevention of 
business-related human rights harm. For home states, principle 7 of the UNGPs makes clear 
recommendations for conflict-affected areas. They advise home states to take into account to 
following: 
1. Engagement: home states should “engage at the earliest stage possible with business 
enterprises to help them identify, prevent, and mitigate the human rights-related risks of 
their operations” (UN 2011, principle 7). 
2. Assistance: home states advised to “provide adequate assistance to businesses in 
assessing and addressing heightened risks of abuse” (Ibid.). 
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3. Deny public support: home state governments should “deny access to public support and 
services for business enterprises that are involved with gross human rights abuses and 
refuse to cooperate in addressing the situation” (Ibid.). 
4. Effective regulation: home states are expected to “ensure that their policies, legislations, 
regulations and enforcement measures are effective in addressing the risk of business 
involvement in gross human rights abuses”. This includes both implementing provisions 
for human rights due diligence and ensuring civil, administrative or criminal liability for 
businesses that violate human rights abroad  (Ibid.). 
 
For companies, the UNGPs recommend they pay specific attention to: 
1. Assessing impacts: a company is required to ensure awareness of any heightened human 
rights risks the operating context might pose. This can be achieved by conducting a 
country-specific human rights risk assessment prior to starting operations, and conducting 
repeat assessments, especially if the context changes (UN 2011, principle 14, 17 and 18). 
2. Integrating findings and taking action: businesses should integrate the findings from 
impact assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take appropriate 
action to mitigate risks. Businesses should take into account that (risks of) severe abuses 
need a more immediate response (UN 2011, principle 19).   
3. Remediation: in the event that a violation does occur in a company’s supply chain, 
businesses should have in place legitimate remediation processes. In conflict contexts, the 
company is advised to engage stakeholders and independent experts to ensure their 
response does not exacerbate the situation (UN 2011, principle 23). 
4. Formal reporting and transparency: Businesses whose operations or operating contexts 
pose heightened risks of more severe human rights impacts should report formally on 
how they address those (UN 2011, principle 21). “A retail company should be able to 
communicate on how it addresses potential and actual human rights abuses in the supply 
chain” (UN 2012, 58). 
 
The following analysis considers the ways in which both TNCs and their home states have 
incorporated the aforementioned recommendations on mitigating additional human rights risks 
that may occur in conflict-affected areas where the host state has limited capacity or willingness 
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to fulfil its duty to protect. I use both the company’s public information on its human rights 
commitments and its response (or non-response) to the BHRRCs survey as a source.8 The 
BHRRC questionnaire offers valuable insight into measures that companies have taken for 
Myanmar specifically, as not all publish separate reports on country-specific policies. Home state 
commitments to the UNGPs conflict recommendations are assessed through analysing NAPs.  
                                               
8 4 out of 9 companies in my sample have not provided a response to the BHRRC survey. I have reached out to 
these companies (Mango, Jack Wolfskin, Calvin Klein and MC Group) via email on 24 April 2020, asking them to 
provide a response. At the moment of submission of this thesis, none of these companies had replied. 
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4. Home state commitments 
The following section presents a summary of home state commitments trends regarding 
business and human rights in conflict-affected areas and severe abuses. Each section begins by 
restating the recommendation in the UNGPs and then discusses the scope and robustness of state 
commitments. The final section discusses trends that can be distinguished from this analysis and 
highlights overarching strengths and weaknesses for the NAPs considered. For a full overview of 
state commitments, please refer to appendix 1. 
4.1. Engagement  
Home states should “engage at the earliest stage possible with business enterprises to 
help them identify, prevent, and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their operations” (UN 
2011, principle 7). 
 
Scope 
All states in the research sample commit, in one way or another, to engage with 
businesses to help them become aware of and address the human rights-related risks of their 
operations abroad. However, none of the states in the sample specify engagement policies that go 
beyond awareness-raising activities. Therefore, the overall state commitment on engagement is 
rather shallow. 
 
Robustness 
While all of the countries in the sample engage with businesses through awareness-
raising activities on the UNGPs, none of them make hard commitments on proactively detecting 
and engaging with companies that operate in conflict-affected areas and are at risk of 
involvement in severe human rights abuse. Some states do have engagement policies for conflict-
affected areas, but apply a very narrow focus on extractive companies that is insufficiently 
substantiated. Germany, for example, has committed itself to establishing binding due diligence 
rules for extractive companies operating in conflict-affected areas (Germany 2016, 22). While 
these policies effectively ensure continued engagement and allow the government to stay 
updated on possible risks as they develop, the narrow focus on extractive companies excludes 
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other types of businesses operating in conflict-areas that might be at an equally high risk of 
abusing human rights. The German NAP does not provide a satisfactory justification for limiting 
the scope of these policies. 
Other countries have aspirations for preventive engagement, but make no concrete 
commitments or plans for implementation. Sweden’s NAP, for example, states “it should be 
mandatory for importers from particularly problematic countries to obtain certification” (Sweden 
2015, 21). Although mandatory certification would certainly provide a good avenue for 
government engagement with corporations operating in high-risk contexts, the NAP does not 
actually commit to implementing this and offers no plan or timeline. At this moment, I was not 
able to find proof that such a policy has been implemented. Similarly, the U.K. “considers” extra 
awareness-raising activities on business and human rights through diplomatic missions where 
there are “concerns”, but offers no clear indication of what steps will be or have been taken to 
realise this (United Kingdom 2016, 11).  
Overall, the states in this sample demonstrate an awareness of the heightened risk of 
serious human rights impacts in conflict-affected areas but lack the policies to actively engage 
with companies who operate therein. All states have committed to carrying out awareness-raising 
activities on the UNGPs in general which can be considered a positive trend, but none of them 
have policies in place to engage proactively with those businesses that might be at a higher risk 
of committing more serious human rights abuses. The majority of states leave the responsibilities 
with companies themselves by “encouraging corporate due diligence and reporting under such 
[conflict-affected] circumstances” (U.S.) without proactively engaging with those who may be at 
a high risk for abusing human rights (US Fed. Gov. 2016, 17). 
4.2. Assistance 
Home states are advised to “provide adequate assistance to businesses in assessing and 
addressing heightened risks of abuse” (UN 2011, principle 7). 
 
Scope 
 83% of states in the sample make strong or moderate commitments for providing 
assistance to businesses in assessing and addressing a heightened risk of abuse. This is the best 
scoring indicators of the four considered here. 
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Robustness 
 83% of states (Germany, Spain, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.) show a strong commitment to 
assisting businesses in assessing and addressing heightened risks of abuse and have a variety of 
policies in place. The U.S. in particular demonstrates a great awareness of the heightened risk of 
serious human rights impacts in conflict-affected areas and recognizes that “the tools and 
resources available to effectively conduct detailed and appropriate risk assessment can be sparse 
(...) in the complex environments where this is most needed” (US Fed. Gov. 2016, 17). In the 
NAP, the U.S. government envisions for itself a clear role in helping businesses “address those 
gaps” by producing and disseminating various resources that help businesses understand and 
respond to human rights and investment conditions around the world (Ibid.). Through the 
provision of country- and subject-level profiles, the U.S. provides effective guidance and advice. 
Moreover, the NAP describes a variety of projects in conflict-affected or high-risk areas, one of 
which focuses on Myanmar.  The U.K., Spain, Sweden, and Germany also demonstrate a strong 
commitment by providing a wide range of country- and sector-specific information (Germany 
and Sweden) and employing diplomatic missions to inform companies on contextual risks (U.K, 
Spain, Sweden, and Germany) and help resolve issues with local authorities (U.K.). 
 Thailand is the only country whose NAP does not specify sufficiently how it will assist 
businesses operating in conflict-affected areas. Judging from the information provided in the 
NAP, Thailand does not provide adequate guidelines for foreign investments in conflict-affected 
areas, does not offer third country information services to alert companies to potential risks, and 
only “considers the establishment of rights protection centres” in areas of conflict without 
making any commitments or specifying what services such centres would offer (Thailand 2019, 
98). 
4.3. Denial of public support 
Home state governments should “deny access to public support and services for business 
enterprises that are involved with gross human rights abuses and refuse to cooperate in 
addressing the situation” (UN 2011, principle 7). 
 
Scope 
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 Only one state in the sample (17%) makes a strong commitment to denying public 
support, in the form of subsidies or other state benefits such as export credits, to companies that 
are involved in gross human rights abuse. One more state (17%) makes a moderate commitment, 
specifying limitations on only a few state benefits. The remaining 67% of states fail to 
incorporate this recommendation into their NAP altogether. Out of the four considered here, 
states score most poorly on this indicator. 
 
Robustness 
 Both Germany and Sweden stand out due to their commitment to denying public support 
to companies that are involved in human rights violations. Germany makes the strongest 
commitment as its NAP states “subsidisation must not conflict with (...) the protection of human 
rights”. Although Germany’s policies for subsidisation and awarding other state benefits already 
take corporate respect for human rights into account, the country has committed to examining 
whether their policies are consistent with the requirements set out in the UNGPs and how 
enterprises receiving “significant subsidies” can be subjected to a future obligation to apply the 
elements of due diligence (Germany 2016, 17). 
 In comparison to Germany, the Swedish commitment is less robust. The Swedish NAP 
does not refer to subsidies but does require the Swedish Export Credit Corporation to “take 
account of conditions such as the environment, corruption, human rights and working conditions 
in its credit assessments” (Sweden 2015, 24). While export credits are a key form of government 
support for businesses, the Swedish NAP leaves unaddressed the many other forms of support 
available. The remaining countries (Thailand, UK, US, and Spain) do not refer to denial of state 
benefits at all in their NAP. As such, they do not attach appropriate consequences to failure by 
business enterprises to respect human rights in conflict-affected areas and/or cooperate to reduce 
risks of violations. 
4.4. Effective regulations 
Home states are expected to “ensure that their policies, legislations, regulations and 
enforcement measures are effective in addressing the risk of business involvement in gross 
human rights abuses”. This includes both implementing provisions for human rights due 
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diligence and ensuring civil, administrative or criminal liability for businesses that violate human 
rights abroad (UN 2011, principle 7). 
 
Scope 
 50% of states in this sample make explicit reference to judicial mechanisms that can be 
accessed by victims of human rights abuses committed by national businesses abroad. Out of 
these, one state (17%) makes a strong commitment while two states (33%) make a moderate 
commitment. The remaining three states (50%) do not sufficiently specify under what legal 
mechanisms victims can find remedies, with the exception of very grave violations like war 
crimes and genocide that are liable under international treaties. 
 
Robustness 
Out of the six states considered, Germany communicates the most robust commitment to 
ensuring effective regulation of business conduct abroad through legal instruments. Germany 
provides clear information on how foreign victims of human rights abuse can press charges and 
allows for the German prosecutors offices to start trials. Consider the following section in the 
German NAP: 
 
Anyone who considers that his or her rights have been infringed abroad by the actions of 
a German enterprise, can bring an action in Germany, normally at the court with local 
jurisdiction for the registered office of the enterprise. (...) Germany’s international civil 
procedure law also contains additional provision whereby the German courts may be 
seized of matters relating to certain offences committed abroad, provided that a sufficient 
connection can be demonstrated. (Germany 2016, 24) 
 
Moreover, to ensure that foreign victims face no restrictions in prosecuting German businesses in 
Germany, Germany offers “litigants of limited means” legal aid for their court proceedings 
(Germany 2016, 24). These provisions are already implemented in German civil courts but the 
German government recognizes that those who are affected by human rights violations might not 
know these remedy mechanisms. To this end, the Federal Government of Germany is tasked with 
producing a multilingual information brochure on access to justice and the courts, giving 
potentially affected individuals and groups an “easy-to-follow summary of the remedies 
available to them under German civil procedural law” (Germany 2016, 25). Although no 
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implementation period or deadline is specified, this commitment is specific and allows for 
follow-up and monitoring by stakeholders. 
 While Germany makes a strong commitment to effectively regulating business conduct in 
conflict-affected areas by ensuring liability under civil law, other states in the sample lag behind 
significantly. The U.K and Sweden make a moderate commitment as they do specify which 
judicial mechanisms offer remedies for victims of human rights abuses overseas, but fail to 
indicate whether domestic prosecutors can start trials. Moreover, these states do not have policies 
in place to ensure that foreign victims of human rights abuse are well informed about the remedy 
mechanisms available, making it questionable that these remedies are accessible to foreign 
victims in practice (Sweden 2015, 10-11; United Kingdom 2016, 20).  
The remaining three states (Spain, Thailand and the U.S.) demonstrate a weak 
commitment to regulating foreign human rights abuse through domestic legal instruments. The 
NAPs of Spain and the U.S. do not specify that domestic judicial mechanisms allow liability for 
businesses that violate human rights abroad, nor indicate that this will be developed. Thailand’s 
NAP specifically states that its judicial mechanisms can only be used for Thai who have been 
victims of corporate-related human rights abuse abroad, thereby decisively excluding foreign 
nationals who have had their rights violated by Thai companies operating overseas. 
4.5. Discussion 
 Overall, it can be concluded that none of the states considered here fully incorporates all 
recommendations for conflict-affected areas and that there is a great variety between different 
indicators and states. Table 2 summarizes the findings discussed in the previous sections. There 
are three trends that can be distilled from the preceding analysis: 1) preference for assistance 
over regulation; 2) lack of commitment and accountability; and 3) discrepancies between EU 
member-states. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
 Engagement Assistance Denial of public 
support 
Effective 
regulation 
Germany Moderate Strong Strong Strong 
Spain Moderate Moderate Weak Weak 
Sweden Moderate Strong Moderate Moderate 
Thailand Moderate Weak Weak Weak 
UK Moderate Strong Weak Moderate 
US Moderate Strong Weak Weak 
Table 2: Commitments state NAPs per indicator. 
4.5.1. Assistance over regulation 
Compared to the indicators on engagement and assistance, the NAPs considered in this 
sample display a weaker commitment to the denial of public support and effective regulation 
indicators. Whilst the first two relate to supporting businesses to respect human rights and reflect 
a predominantly collaborative relationship between the state and enterprise, the latter two 
directly relate to regulating business activity, both ex ante and ex post. The results presented here 
indicate that states are more reluctant to regulate the conduct of their businesses abroad, even in 
conflict-affected areas, and prefer to take a ‘softer’ approach, focussing on engagement and 
assistance. The discussion below further illustrates this point. 
  As previously discussed, the states considered here have scored most poorly on the denial 
of public support indicator, reflecting a reluctance to directly regulate business activity abroad 
through hard measures. It is interesting to draw a comparison here with the generalised system of 
preferences (GSP), a programme implemented by the US and EU that allows exporters rom 
developing countries to pay lower or no duties to on exports. As such, it offers, the Office of the 
US Trade Representative states, “opportunities for many of the world’s poorest countries to use 
trade to grow their economies and climb out of poverty” (US Trade Representative 2019). The 
GSP can thus be interpreted as a form of public support, not dissimilar to export credits or 
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subsidies offered to domestic companies. By contrast, however, the benefits under the GSP are 
conditional and can be withdrawn when recipient states do not comply with human rights 
principles in general (EU) and labour rights in particular (US and EU). The fact that GSP is 
conditional and public support for TNCs is not highlights hypocrisy in the business and human 
rights policies of the US, the UK and Spain. While these states do deny access to public support 
under the GSP scheme to developing states that lack respect for human rights, they do not apply 
this same rhetoric to their domestic companies abusing human rights abroad. 
The preceding analysis has also highlighted the failure of all but one state (Germany) to 
sufficiently explore regulatory options to ensure access to remedies for victims of human rights 
abuse abroad. Only three of the six considered NAPs explicitly allow foreign victims of human 
rights abuses that can be attributed to ‘their’ national companies to seek judicial remedies within 
their states. Out of these three, only Germany’s NAP commits to the implementation of 
additional policies to ensure that foreign victims are aware of and have access to remedial 
options in the home state. With the exception of Germany, the NAPs of all states considered here 
contain very few action points on the development of additional regulatory actions and remedies, 
especially when compared to other topics such as awareness-raising and information provision.  
A failure to effectively regulate corporations through denying public support and judicial 
accountability is problematic because it does not attach the appropriate consequences to 
businesses violating human rights abroad. Instead, it may foster a situation in which businesses 
can ‘pick and choose’ whether they would like to engage with and receive assistance from the 
state on business and human rights related topics. 
4.5.2. Lack of commitment and accountability  
All states considered in this sample provide commitments to future action in the NAPs in 
addition to evaluating past actions the state had taken. However, in the vast majority of cases, the 
future action points that are included in the NAP are overly vague and lack explanations of the 
concrete steps the state will take and in what timeframe. This makes it difficult for stakeholders 
to adequately monitor whether a state has implemented the actions it committed to in its NAP 
and hold the state accountable for failure to do so.  
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4.5.3. Discrepancies between EU member-states 
Out of the 6 states considered here, 4 are EU member-states.9 As EU member-states 
closely collaborate on issues relating to human rights through various EU institutions, such as the 
EU parliament and European Court of Human Rights, one should expect the NAPs of the EU 
countries considered here to be quite similar. This is, however, not the case as there are many 
discrepancies. 
When comparing the NAPs of EU member-states, the German NAP stands out as it 
displays the overall strongest commitment to regulating the activities of domestic corporations in 
conflict-affected areas, communicating clear and effective policies on assistance, denial of public 
support and effective regulation. Comparably, the other EU member-states fall behind 
significantly. How can we explain these discrepancies between states that closely collaborate on 
human rights issues? 
 
 Engagement Assistance Denial of public 
support 
Effective 
regulation 
Germany Moderate Strong Strong Strong 
Spain Moderate Moderate Weak Weak 
Sweden Moderate Strong Moderate Moderate 
UK Moderate Strong Weak Moderate 
Table 3: Commitments EU member-state NAPs per indicator. 
 
One possible explanation is the fact that the EU did not provide any guidelines or support 
to member-states whilst developing their NAPs. On the topic of NAPs, the 2015-2019 EU action 
plan on human rights states that the development and implementation of NAPs is the sole 
responsibility of member-states and no EU body was assigned any responsibility in this aspect 
(Council of the EU 2015, 29). As previously discussed, states face economic disincentives to 
                                               
9 The UK left the EU in January 2020. However, as the UK’s NAP was written while the state was still part of the 
EU, it still makes sense to consider its contents in relation to those of other EU member-states and EU regulations 
and policies. 
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including more harsh policies in their NAPs as this may undercut their competitiveness when 
other states do not pursue similar policies, resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma. By providing 
guidelines and support for the development of NAPs, the EU could have significantly reduced 
these disincentives and may have reduced the discrepancies between member states. 
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5. Company commitments 
The following section presents a summary of company commitments regarding human 
rights in conflict-affected areas. Each section begins by restating the recommendation as stated in 
the UNGPs and then discusses the scope and robustness of company commitments. The final 
section discusses trends that can be discerned and highlights the weaknesses and strengths of 
company commitments. For an overview of company commitments, please refer to appendix 2. 
5.1. Assessing impacts 
A company is required to ensure awareness of any heightened human rights risks the 
operating context might pose. This can be achieved by conducting a country-specific human 
rights risk assessment prior to starting operations, and conducting repeat assessments, especially 
if the context changes (UN 2011, principles 14, 17 and 18). 
 
Scope 
This indicator can be subdivided into two: 1) whether the company has in place processes 
for enhanced risk assessments for high-risk operating contexts; and 2) whether the company has 
conducted a country-specific assessment prior to starting operations in Myanmar. Compliance 
with the first indicator demonstrates that the company has a baseline awareness of the 
importance of becoming aware of additional contextual risks and has policies in place to do so. 
As Myanmar is generally indicated as a high-risk production location, conducting a country-
specific analysis communicates a deeper commitment on behalf of the enterprise to become 
aware of any additional risks the operating context poses.  
 33% of companies in this sample specify in their policies under what circumstances an 
enhanced risk assessment would be necessary and how this should be executed. The human 
rights policies of the remaining 77% of companies do not specify either. 
45% of companies in the sample have conducted a country-specific risk assessment prior 
to sourcing from Myanmar. 55% of companies did not conduct such an assessment or failed to 
communicate bout this.  
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Robustness 
Three out of the nine reviewed companies indicate, in their policies, that certain contexts 
demand additional risk assessments and specify how these are to take place. Adidas and Marks & 
Spencer have policies in place that profile both geographical locations and individual factories 
based on the level of risk and subject those to additional risk assessment measures. Both 
companies involve civil society organisations and/or external exports to map context specific 
risks.  The third company, Jack Wolfskin, is a member of the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), an 
organisation that works with over 130 companies in the garment industry to improve human 
rights throughout their supply chains. FWF has categorized the countries in which its members 
operate on the basis of risk and requires enhanced monitoring programs for some, including 
Myanmar. The six remaining companies do not specify when an enhanced risk assessment would 
be necessary and how this should be carried out. While H&M does take a step in the right 
direction by requiring risk assessments for all new markets and suppliers, the company fails to 
specify how heightened risk may require enhanced assessment practices.  
Four companies undertook a country-specific risk assessment prior to starting to source 
from Myanmar, all of which included consultations with stakeholders. Gap, as the first U.S. 
based retailer to start sourcing from Myanmar, undertook a particularly thorough risk 
assessment. To become aware of how human rights issues and the local operating environment 
impact and may be affected by their business conduct, Gap’s risk assessment included 
consultations with “key stakeholders across sectors” such as civil society and workers 
organizations in Myanmar, U.S government agencies, the ILO and international NGOs with 
specialized expertise in Myanmar (Gap 2014, 2). Adidas, H&M and Primark also indicate that 
their risk analysis included consultations with external stakeholders. 
The remaining five companies did provide enough evidence that they undertook a 
country-specific risk assessment for Myanmar. These are the same companies that failed to 
respond to the BHRRC survey (Jack Wolfskin, MC Group, Mango and Calvin Klein) or only 
provided a short statement referring to their policies, without answering any questions (Marks & 
Spencer).10 Although Marks & Spencer’s policies state that they consider it “important to 
understand where their operations and sourcing impacts adversely on individuals”, there is no 
                                               
10 I have contacted these four companies (Jack Wolfskin, Mango, MC Group and Calvin Klein) to request more 
information on the nature of their investment in Myanmar and gave them the opportunity to provide answers to the 
BHRRC survey. None of these companies have responded despite my reminders. 
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evidence that indicates that the company conducted a proper assessment before sourcing from 
Myanmar (Marks & Spencer “Human Rights”).  
5.2. Integrating findings and taking action  
Businesses should integrate the findings from impact assessments across relevant internal 
functions and processes, and take appropriate action to mitigate risks. Businesses should take 
into account that (risks of) severe abuses need a more immediate response (UN 2011, principle 
19).   
 
Scope 
This indicator can be subdivided into three implications: 1) whether the enterprise 
integrates findings from their risk assessment and identifies context-specific human rights risks; 
2) whether the enterprise has in place policies to prevent or mitigate these key human rights 
risks; and 3) whether the enterprise prioritizes actions according to severity. 
 78% of companies in the sample identify human rights risks that are particularly salient in 
their supply chains. However, only 33% of companies communicate about context-specific 
salient human rights risks, displaying a strong commitment to this indicator. The remaining 44% 
of companies identify global human rights priorities that do not appear to be context-specific, 
displaying a moderate commitment. 22% of companies in this sample did not identify which 
specific human rights are at risks in their supply chain. 
 33% of companies in the sample demonstrate a strong commitment to prevention and 
mitigation by having in place additional policies that are tailored to context-specific risks and 
supplemental policies to help suppliers comply. A further 44% demonstrates a moderate 
commitment, as they do not have in place policies to mitigate context-specific key risks, but do 
specify how they support suppliers in complying with their other prevention and mitigation 
policies. Lastly, 22% of companies demonstrate a weak commitment by specifying few or no 
policies to mitigate context-specific key human rights risks and do not offer support to suppliers 
in helping them comply with their policies. 
 67% of companies indicate, in their policies, some kind of prioritization for more severe 
human rights abuses. Although all of these companies specify which violations would be 
considered severe, only 22% specify what kinds of actions these would necessitate and in what 
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timeframe these should be resolved. Therefore, 22% of companies in the sample display a strong 
commitment to prioritizing action according to severity, 44% display moderate commitment, and 
33% display a weak commitment, failing to provide sufficient information on if and how they 
prioritize according to severity. 
 
Robustness 
While the majority of companies in the sample integrate findings from risk assessments 
to identify which human rights are particularly at risk in their supply chains, only a small 
minority does so on a localized scale. Although identifying global priorities is important because 
it allows for the development of effective, large-scale project and procedures to tackle human 
rights issues that occur frequently in a variety of locations, such as workplace safety (which has 
been identified as a salient human rights issue by all but one of the companies in this sample), it 
does not demonstrate an awareness of heightened human rights risks in conflict-affected areas in 
general or Myanmar in particular. Only three countries in this sample (Adidas, Gap and Jack 
Wolfskin) demonstrate awareness of context specific risks for Myanmar.11 These risks include 
child and forced labour, working hours and wages, freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, corruption and governance, land right and property acquisition, discrimination and 
ethnic conflict, and building and fire safety.  
 Companies that demonstrate a strong commitment to prevention and mitigation have put 
in place additional policies tailored to context-specific risks. Adidas demonstrates a best-practice 
as, following their country-specific risk assessment, the company has put in place supplementary 
procedures for suppliers from Myanmar and is assisting its suppliers in achieving compliance, if 
necessary.  Firstly, Adidas requires suppliers who propose any land acquisition to commission an 
independent party for review and to consider community impacts, including displacement and 
livelihood issues. This demonstrates that Adidas is aware of issues regarding land grabbing in 
Myanmar and has taken appropriate steps to prevent violations relating to this. Secondly, Adidas 
has made independent structural engineering assessment mandatory for all production facilities 
in Myanmar following concerns over the weak permitting system, demonstrating that Adidas has 
                                               
11 H&M has stated, in its response to the BHRRC survey, that it produced two documents for Myanmar specifically: 
the “BSR Responsible Sourcing Principles” and “H&M’s Sustainability Strategy for Myanmar”. However, neither 
of these documents can be found online and H&M has not replied to my question on where one could find these 
documents.   
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taken on additional responsibilities to compensate for the weak regulatory context in Myanmar 
and the state’s proven incapability to ensure building safety. GAP and Marks & Spencer also 
demonstrate a strong commitment to this indicator by having in place policies that effectively 
address Myanmar-specific risks, as well as additional policies to help suppliers comply. 
Companies that demonstrate a moderate commitment to prevention and mitigation do not 
have in place policies that mitigate context-specific human rights risks, but do have in place 
policies that support suppliers in complying with their other human rights policies, such as 
capacity building services (Calvin Klein and H&M) and training for staff (Jack Wolfskin and 
Mango). They may also have in place policies that mitigate non context-specific key human 
rights concerns. Companies that demonstrate a weak commitment (MC Group and Primark) do 
not have in place policies to mitigate context-specific key human rights risks nor do they support 
suppliers in improving their human rights performance. Interestingly, Primark did undertake a 
country-specific assessment prior to sourcing from Myanmar, but the limited information 
Primark provides does not demonstrate that the company adopted policies that effectively target 
the challenges of operating in Myanmar. 
The companies that display the most robust commitment to prioritizing according to 
severity clearly state which violations are counted as more or most severe and link these to well-
defined actions and timeframes. Calvin Klein, for example, expects suppliers to prioritize most 
severe issues and provides a list of “critical immediate action issues”, which are to be corrected 
within 7 business days after assessment. These include payment below minimum wage, 
discrimination and building safety issues. For all other non-compliance issues, Calvin Klein 
requires suppliers to present a corrective action plan within 14 calendar days. Adidas and Marks 
& Spencer similarly instruct suppliers to prioritize according to severity and list issues that 
require immediate engagement. 
Companies that display a less robust commitment to prioritization do categorize non-
compliance issues according to severity, but do not specify the kinds of actions this necessitates 
nor the timeframe in which these must be resolved (Gap and H&M). Gap, for example, 
categorises violations by level of severity into “critical”, “severe”, “key” and “noncompliant”, 
but does not specify which actions each of these trigger and within what timeframe violations are 
to be resolved (Gap “Improving Supply Chain”). GAP merely states that they “outline a timeline 
within which we expect the facility to fully remediate” depending on the “severity of the issue” 
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(Ibid.). Whilst this is a step in the right direction, the lack of commitment to specific timeframes 
and/or actions makes it difficult for victims and CSOs to hold the company accountable. 
 Companies demonstrating a weak commitment to prioritizing according to severity either 
do not indicate that they prioritize the remediation of more severe issues at all (Jack Wolfskin 
and Primark) or only provide high-level statements on the importance of prioritization, but fail to 
specify what non-compliance issues would be regarded as severe and how and in what timeframe 
these should be addressed (Mango, Marks & Spencer, MC Group). The latter cannot be 
considered a substantial commitment to prioritization but merely a ceremonial commitment, as 
they do not include any policies that victims, consumers, and CSOs can hold companies 
accountable to. 
5.3. Remediation 
In the event that a violation does occur in a company’s supply chain, businesses should 
have in place legitimate processes to provide for or cooperate in the remediation of affected 
stakeholders. In conflict contexts, the company is advised to engage stakeholders and 
independent experts to ensure their response does not exacerbate the situation (UN 2011, 
principle 23). 
 
Scope 
Remediation can be subdivided into two indicators: 1) whether the company discloses 
substantive information on the process they have in place to provide remedies to affected 
stakeholder and 2) whether the company engages with stakeholders and independent experts to 
ensure that their response does not exacerbate the situation. 
Regarding the first indicator, 44% of companies in this sample provide strong 
information on the remedies they have in place for affected stakeholders, often supported with 
case examples. 22% of companies make a moderate commitment and 33% make a weak 
commitment. 
44% of companies in the sample indicate, in their human rights policies, that they engage 
third parties for the remediation of more complex human rights issues to ensure that they do not 
exacerbate the situation. The remaining 56% of companies do not make such commitments at all.  
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Robustness 
Companies in the research sample that display a strong commitment to remediation do so 
by disclosing specific details about their process to provide remedies to affected stakeholders 
and/or by disclosing illustrative examples of instances in which the company has provided 
effective remediation. PVH, the parent company of Calvin Klein exemplifies a strong 
commitment for the provision of and communication about remedies as it states, in its supply 
chain guidelines, that “any discovered non-compliances will result in the creation of a corrective 
action plan (...) with detailed root cause evaluation, timelines for completion, and [specification 
of] responsible parties”, which should be provided to PVH within 14 calendar days (PVH 2020, 
31). In addition, PVH states it works with suppliers to suggest remedial actions, tools, or other 
resources to effectively address the issues and, when feasible, will support suppliers in 
developing and executing the corrective action plan. A key strength of PVHs approach is its 
emphasis on Root Cause Analysis (RCA), which considers physical, human and organisational 
causes and focuses on “investigating the patterns of negative effects, finding hidden flaws in the 
system, and discovering specific actions that contributed to the problem” (Ibid., 161). This 
strategy can help PVH to provide more effective remedies to stakeholders and reduce systemic 
issues in the long run. 
Companies that display a weak commitment to disclosing information on their 
remediation policies (Mango, MC Group and Primark) generally only provide high-level 
statements on the importance of effective remedies but fail to specify what appropriate 
remediation procedures should look like throughout their supply chain and how these are 
implemented. These cannot be considered a substantial commitment to remediation, as they offer 
no opportunities for victims, consumers and CSOs to hold the company accountable.  
Within a conflict-affected environment, human rights issues are often complex or 
systemic. Remediation efforts should therefore be tailored to the context as some responses may 
exacerbate the situation or create new issues. 44% of companies explicitly state that they engage 
third parties for more complex non-compliance issues to ensure that their response does not 
exacerbate the situation. This is achieved through participating in collaborative initiatives such as 
the ILO Better Work Program and the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (GAP) or through engaging 
directly with government, CSOs and other stakeholders (H&M, Adidas and Marks & Spencer). 
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The remaining five companies do not specify if and how they engage third parties for the 
remediation of more complex human rights issues.  
5.4. Formal reporting and transparency  
Businesses whose operations or operating contexts pose heightened risks of more severe 
human rights impacts should report formally on how they address those (UN 2011, principle 21). 
“A retail company should be able to communicate on how it addresses potential and actual 
human rights abuses in the supply chain” (UN 2012, 58). 
 
Scope 
 This section can be subdivided into two indicators: 1) communication of formal reports 
and 2) transparency about how the company addresses actual and potential violations.  
89% of companies communicate about their human rights efforts through formal periodic 
reports. Only one company in the sample does not adequately address human rights in its formal 
reporting. 
 One company (11%) can be considered fully transparent about the potential and actual 
human rights impacts throughout their supply chain and how these issues have been addressed, 
demonstrating a strong commitment. 45% of companies demonstrate a moderate commitment, as 
they fail to specify either the types of violations that occurred, where violations occurred, or how 
violations were addressed. The remaining 45% of companies in the sample cannot be considered 
transparent about the potential and actual violations in their supply chains. 
 
Robustness 
The vast majority of companies (8 out of 9) report formally on how they address human 
rights risks throughout their supply chain through periodic sustainability reports. Most 
companies report yearly through either a separate human rights report or by dedicating a chapter 
to human rights in their sustainability report. Only MC Group does not adequately report on its 
human rights efforts as the company only produces yearly financial reports, which do not address 
human rights. 
 While producing formal reports can be considered a base-line commitment, providing 
information about the number and types of human rights violations the enterprise identifies 
  
42 
 
throughout its supply chain, as well as where these occur and how these have been addressed, 
communicates a more substantial commitment to transparency. Adidas is the only company in 
the sample to demonstrate such a strong commitment. Adidas produces a detailed, yearly 
summary of the human rights complaints it handled, which includes detailed information about 
the type of violation, where it occurred, how the complaint was filed to Adidas, and what Adidas 
has done to remediate the adverse impact (Adidas 2018).  
The companies that display a moderate commitment to transparency do not provide 
information on where a non-compliance issue occurred and/or how these were resolved. H&M, 
for example, does specify the number of human rights related non-compliance issues that 
occurred throughout its supply chain, but does not specify where these occurred and how, if at 
all, these issues were resolved. Similarly, Calvin Klein is transparent about the overall 
performance of individual suppliers, but does not disclose the number or types of non-
compliance issues and how these were resolved. Gap, on the other hand, is transparent about 
both the number and types of non-compliance issues it detects in its supply chain, the country in 
which these occurred and the timeframe in which these are resolved, but is not transparent about 
in which factory it occurred and how it was remedied.  
The remaining four companies (Mango, Marks & Spencer, MC Group and Primark) do 
not provide information on the kinds of non-compliance issues that occurred within their supply 
chains and how these were resolved. Some companies (Mango and MC Group) also do not 
disclose their suppliers publicly, making it extremely difficult for stakeholders to hold brands 
accountable for human rights violations that occur throughout their supply chains. 
5.5. Discussion 
Overall, the preceding analysis has demonstrated that there are great disparities in the 
ways garment TNCs operating in Myanmar incorporate the UNGPs recommendations for 
conflict-affected areas. While Adidas scores very well on the indicators considered here, other 
TNCs lag behind significantly. Companies score particularly poorly on transparency, the 
significance of which will be discussed in more detail below. Additionally, we can identify a 
correlation between the commitments made by TNCs and those of their home states.  
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 Assessing impacts Integrating findings and taking 
action 
Remediation Formal reporting and 
transparency 
Processes Country-
specific 
assess- 
ment 
Identify- 
ing key 
risks 
Prevent- 
ion and 
mitiga-    
tion 
Prioriti- 
zing 
Processes Engaging 
with third 
parties 
Formal 
reports 
Transpar- 
ency 
Adidas Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong  Strong 
Calvin 
Klein 
Weak Weak Moderate Moderate Strong Strong Weak Strong Moderate 
Gap Weak Strong Strong Strong Moderate Moderate Strong Strong Moderate 
H&M Weak Strong Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Strong Strong Moderate 
Jack 
Wolfskin 
Strong Weak Strong Moderate Weak Strong Weak Strong Moderate 
Mango Weak Weak Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak 
Marks & 
Spencer 
Strong Weak Moderate Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak 
MC 
Group 
Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
Primark Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong Weak 
Table 4: company commitments per indicator 
5.5.1. Lack of transparency 
 While the businesses considered here score well on the formal reporting indicator, they 
score very poorly on transparency. Only Adidas can be considered sufficiently transparent about 
their supply chains, the violations that occur therein and how these are resolved. Others provide 
limited (45%) or virtually no information (45%). As such, consumers and other stakeholders 
cannot be fully aware of manufacturing conditions, restricting their ability to hold businesses 
accountable. 
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 This is problematic because the UNGPs rest on the premise that businesses will act in 
accordance with the guidelines to prevent reputational damage. However, as has become 
apparent from my analysis, businesses do not implement the transparency adviced in the UNGPs 
and can thereby reduce such reputational risks. The reluctance of businesses to be transparent 
about the violations that occur in their supply chain is especially problematic in conflict-affected 
conxtext such as Myanmar. In Myanmar, as in many other conflict-affected contexts, there are 
restrictions on freedom of expression and association, which restricts labor protests, union 
gatherings and the ability of workers to voice their concerns collectively (World Justice Project 
2020). This exacerbates the lack of transparency because it hides violations that occur in 
Myanmar’s factories from the eyes of consumers and other stakeholders who, the UNGPs state, 
should hold companies accountable for their actions. 
 While the UNGPs emphasize that not adhering to the recommendations can negatively 
affect a business’ reputation, it fails to account for the fact that in conflict-affected contexts the 
business itself has a large influence over what information is and is not available to consumers 
and CSOs. Information, in this context, is not a neutral factor between actors and cannot be said 
to have the ‘sword of Damocles’ function that the UNGPs ascribe to it. 
5.5.2. TNCs and their home states 
 When comparing the conduct of TNCs and their home states there does appear to be a 
correlation, although the small sample size of this study does not provide enough date to make 
any conclusive statements. By awarding 100% to strong, 50% to moderate, and 0% to weak 
commitments, we can roughly compare the scores of companies and their home states by plotting 
them on a scatter chart (see Figure 1). The sample correlation coefficient (R) in this case is 
0.712, indicating significance.12 More research would be needed to confirm this correlation with 
more certainty. However, from my analysis there is a clear indication that commitments of states 
influence those of the companies domiciled in their territory. 
  
                                               
12 For a sample of 9, the 95% critical value of the sample correlation coefficient is 0.707. 
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Figure 1: correlation between company and state scores 
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6. Conclusions 
At the root of the business and human rights debate lays “the governance gaps created by 
globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and capacities of societies to 
manage their adverse consequences” (HRC 2008, 3). This is especially evident in states that lack 
the institutional capacity to legislate and enforce national laws to protect citizens against 
corporate-related human rights harm, or in the context of conflict, and human rights are arguably 
most at risk here. Although the UNGPs indicate the host state as the only bearer of duties, they 
aim to resolve governance gaps in contexts where the host state is incapable or unwilling to fulfil 
this duty by making additional recommendations for home states and corporations. 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the UNGPs do not resolve all the governance 
gaps the documents sets out to do. Home states remain reluctant to regulate the conduct of 
national businesses abroad through denial of public support and judicial mechanisms and, 
instead, tend to focus on providing assistance to companies in avoiding human rights violations. 
Whilst assistance is an important aspect of supporting corporate respect for human rights, not 
attaching appropriate consequences to corporations failing to respect human rights may not have 
the effect of changing the corporate behaviour. Instead, it may create a situation in which 
corporations can ‘pick and choose’ whether they engage with their home state on business and 
human rights related topics. The foregoing analysis of NAPs has also highlighted that in the vast 
majority of cases, the future action points of states are overly vague and lack explanations of the 
concrete steps the state will take and in what timeframe, which significantly restricts the ability 
of society to hold the government accountable. 
TNCs, on the other hand, remain non-transparent about their supply chains and the 
violations therein. This is problematic because the UNGPs rest on the premise that businesses 
will act in accordance with its recommendations to avoid reputational damage. Conflict-affected 
contexts likely further exacerbate this because restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and 
expression prohibit stories of corporate-related human rights violations reaching consumers and 
CSOs.   
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The limitations of this thesis should also be highlighted however. A major one of which 
is the small size of the sample. The results presented here should be read as preliminary. Future 
inquiries would be strengthened by including more states and TNCs in the sample as this may 
give rise to addition insight and can further our understanding on the correlation between the 
commitments of TNCs and their home states. Having said that, the results presented here do 
highlight some key weaknesses of the UNGPs in the context limited host state interference and 
may serve as a starting point for more research into how we can reduce corporate-related human 
rights harm in these contexts. 
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Appendix 1: overview of state commitments per recommendation 
 Engagement Assistance Deny public support Effective regulation 
Germany Only engagement 
policies for higher-
risk areas and 
businesses focus on 
the extractive 
industry. 
Provides a wide range 
of country and sector-
specific information 
and can provide 
tailored advice through 
foreign missions. 
Human rights are 
considered in 
subsidization and 
awarding other 
benefits such as export 
credits 
Allows for foreign 
victims to press charges 
and for prosecutors to 
start trial. Ensures 
access for foreign 
victims. 
Spain General UNGPs 
awareness-raising 
activities with a 
focus on companies 
that may affect 
vulnerable groups. 
No coherent outreach 
policies for 
companies operating 
in conflict. 
Aims to inform 
businesses in conflict-
affected areas through 
foreign missions, but 
does not specify how 
and what kind of 
information will be 
disseminated. 
Not specified The remedy mechanisms 
that are planned to be 
developed do not opt 
decisively for 
extraterritorial judicial 
mechanisms 
Sweden Communicates 
aspirations for 
engagement but has 
no policies in place. 
Is carrying out 
general UNGPs 
awareness-raising 
activities. 
Embassies should 
gather information, 
especially in conflict-
affected areas. Reports 
on human rights 
around the world, but 
these are not tailored 
to business. 
Export credit agency 
is required to take 
account of conditions 
such as the 
environment, 
corruption, human 
rights and working 
conditions in its credit 
assessments. No 
mention of subsidies 
Explicitly refers to 
extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, only when 
companies commit 
actions that are 
criminalized in the 
country of occurrence. 
No extra provisions to 
ensure access to justice. 
Thailand Limited engagement 
efforts on UNGPs in 
general 
Insufficient Not specified NAP does not specify 
that Thailand’s judicial 
mechanisms allow 
liability for businesses 
that violate human rights 
abroad, or that this will 
be developed. 
UK Limited outreach. 
Only some 
awareness-raising 
projects on the 
UNGPs and a project 
which is being 
'considered' for high-
risk areas. No further 
information 
provided. 
Diplomatic missions 
both inform on risks 
and help to resolve 
issues with local 
authorities 
Not specified Identifies judicial 
mechanisms that offer 
remedies for victims of 
human rights abuses in 
the UK and overseas. 
Does not specify 
whether prosecutors can 
start a trial or ensure 
access to justice. 
US Aims to encourage Produces a variety of Not specified Does not specify under 
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due diligence in 
conflict-affected 
areas, but lists no 
policies to do so. 
Outreach on UNGPs 
in general. 
resources. Examples 
of effective projects in 
conflict-areas 
what legal mechanisms 
victims can find 
remedies, with the 
exception of war crimes. 
No mention of 
extraterritorial 
jurisdiction 
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Appendix 2: overview of company commitments per recommendation 
 Enhanced risk 
assessment 
Integrating findings and taking 
action 
Remediation Formal reporting 
and transparency  
  Processe
s 
Country-
specific 
assessme
nt 
Identifyi
ng key 
risks 
Preventi
on and 
mitigatio
n 
Prioritiz
ation 
Remedia
tion 
processe
s 
Engagin
g with 
third 
parties 
Formal 
reports 
Transpar
ency 
Adidas Addition
al 
monitori
ng 
requirem
ents 
determin
ed by 
risk of 
both 
country 
and 
factory. 
Risk 
mapping 
includes 
engagem
ent with 
civil 
society. 
Conduct
ed a two 
year 
review 
and 
stakehol
der 
engagem
ent prior 
to start 
in 
Myanma
r. 
Has 
listed 
specific 
risks for 
Myanma
r and 
links 
these to 
its own 
actions 
Extra 
policies 
tailored 
to 
context-
specific 
risks 
(land 
grabbing 
and 
addition
al 
structura
l 
engineer
ing 
monitori
ng) 
Yes. 
"Zero 
tolerance 
points" 
and 
"threshol
d 
issues". 
Severe 
violation
s require 
immedia
te and 
urgent 
engagem
ent. 
All non-
complia
nce 
issues 
reviewed 
and 
investiga
ted. 
Example
s 
provided
. Options 
include 
terminati
on and 
warning 
letters. 
Yes Yes, 
yearly 
formal 
report. 
Transpar
ent 
about 
number 
and 
types of 
non-
complia
nce 
issues, 
where 
these 
occur 
and how 
these are 
resolved.  
Calvin 
Klein 
Does not 
specify 
when 
enhance
d risk 
assessme
nt is 
necessar
y and 
how this 
should 
be 
carried 
out 
No 
country 
specific 
assessme
nt for 
Myanma
r 
Sets 
global 
human 
rights 
priorities 
/ key 
issues 
but these 
are not 
tailored 
to 
specific 
contexts  
Policies 
to 
mitigate 
key, non 
context-
specific 
risks. 
Assist 
suppliers 
in 
complia
nce. 
Requires 
suppliers 
to 
prioritize 
accordin
g to 
severity 
and 
provides 
a list of 
critical 
issues 
which 
should 
be 
resolved 
within 7 
working 
days.  
Remedia
tion 
specified
. 
Includes 
assisting 
supplier 
in 
developi
ng 
correctiv
e action 
plan 
with 
RCA 
Not 
specified 
Yes, 
yearly 
formal 
report. 
Is 
transpare
nt about 
the 
overall 
performa
nce of 
individu
al 
suppliers
, but 
does not 
disclose 
number 
or types 
of non-
complia
nce 
issues. 
GAP Does not 
specify 
when 
Yes, 
conducte
d a 
Lists 
specific 
risks, 
Extra 
policies 
in place 
Does 
categoriz
e 
Sets out 
framewo
rk for 
Partners 
with 
"peers in 
Yes, 
yearly 
formal 
Informat
ion 
about 
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enhance
d risk 
assessme
nt is 
necessar
y and 
how this 
should 
be 
carried 
out 
country-
specific 
assessme
nt prior 
to 
sourcing 
from 
Myanma
r. 
Includes 
consultat
ions 
with 
stakehol
ders. 
followin
g 
country-
specific 
assessme
nt 
for 
context-
specific 
issues. 
"Unique 
program
s to 
address 
local 
economi
c, 
political, 
business 
and 
cultural 
context 
where 
needed" 
accordin
g to 
severity, 
but does 
not 
specify 
the kinds 
of 
actions 
this 
necessita
tes or the 
timefram
e in 
which 
these 
must be 
resolved. 
correctiv
e action 
plans, 
but these 
remain 
vague 
and do 
not 
indicate 
how 
stakehol
ders can 
receive 
remedies 
from 
Gap 
collabor
ative 
initiative
s" for 
the most 
complex 
and 
pressing 
human 
rights 
challeng
es.  
report the 
number 
and 
types of 
non-
complia
nce 
issues 
and the 
timefram
e in 
which 
these are 
resolved. 
No 
informat
ion 
about 
where 
these 
occur 
and how 
they are 
resolved. 
H&M Requires 
risk 
assessme
nts for 
new 
markets 
and 
suppliers
. Does 
not 
specify 
how 
heighten
ed risk 
may 
require 
enhance
d 
assessme
nt 
practices
. 
Risk 
analysis 
prior to 
sourcing 
from 
Myanma
r. Incl. 
consultat
ions 
with 
external 
stakehol
ders.  
Identifie
s global 
'salient 
issues' 
yearly, 
not  
context- 
specific. 
H&Ms 
strategy 
on 
Myanma
r is not 
available 
online 
and 
H&M 
did not 
respond 
to my 
request.  
Mitigati
on 
policies 
focus on 
enabling 
dialogue 
and 
negotiati
on. 
Address
es 
context-
specific 
key 
human 
rights 
issues on 
project 
basis. 
Categori
zes 
accordin
g to 
severity, 
but does 
not 
specify 
the kinds 
of 
actions 
this 
necessita
tes or the 
timefram
e in 
which 
these 
must be 
resolved. 
Does not 
specify 
remediat
ion 
policies. 
Provides 
some 
example
s of 
remediat
ion in 
the past.  
H&M 
states it 
tackles 
systemic 
issues 
with 
other 
actors in 
the 
market, 
as well 
as 
through 
public 
affairs 
work 
Yes, 
yearly 
formal 
report 
Specifyi
ng 
number 
and 
types of 
issues, 
but not 
where 
these 
took 
place 
and 
whether 
and how 
they 
were 
resolved. 
Jack 
Wolfski
n 
FWF 
requires 
an 
enhance
d 
monitori
ng 
No 
country-
specific 
analysis 
performe
d before 
sourcing
Integrate
s 
Myanma
r 
recomm
endation
s from 
Mitigati
on 
efforts 
focus 
primaril
y on 
training. 
Does not 
categoriz
e non-
complia
nce 
issues 
nor 
Impleme
nts FWF 
remediat
ion 
process, 
which 
included 
Does not 
specify, 
FWF 
also 
does not 
index 
this. 
Year, 
three 
yearly 
sustaina
bility 
report 
and 
FWF 
publishe
s 
auditing 
results 
and non-
complia
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program 
for 
Myanma
r. As a 
member, 
this 
applies 
to Jack 
Wolfski
n. 
. 
FWF 
complete
d a 
country 
study in 
2016, 
well 
after 
Jack 
Wolfski
n started 
sourcing 
in 
Myanma
r in 
2013. 
FWF, 
these 
require 
addition
al 
concern 
for 
Myanma
r-
specific 
issues. 
Does not 
specify 
how it 
aims to 
mitigate 
context-
specific 
risks or 
support 
suppliers
. 
specify 
how it 
prioritize
s actions 
accordin
g to 
severity. 
RCA. 
Case 
example
s 
provided
.  
yearly 
brand 
performa
nce 
check 
through 
FWF. 
nce 
issues. 
Has 
recently 
failed on 
some of 
its 
reporting 
requirem
ents, 
failing to 
report on 
2 out of 
5 
factories
.  
Mango Does not 
specify 
when 
enhance
d risk 
assessme
nt is 
needed 
or how 
this 
should 
be 
executed
.  
No 
country 
specific 
assessme
nt for 
Myanma
r 
Global 
priorities 
only. 
These do 
no 
demonst
rate an 
awarene
ss of 
heighten
ed risks 
for 
conflict-
affected 
areas. 
Mention
s 
training 
and 
'drawing 
up an 
action 
plan'. 
Does not 
specify 
how it 
aims to 
mitigate 
context-
specific 
risks or 
support 
suppliers
. 
No. 
Only 
mentions 
‘serious 
issues’ 
but does 
not 
specify. 
Remedia
tion 
measure
s only 
focus on 
ensuring 
complia
nce. No 
RCA. 
Not 
specified
.  
Yes, 
yearly 
formal 
sustaina
bility 
reports 
Does not 
publicly 
disclose 
its 
suppliers
, 
auditing 
results, 
or 
violation
s and 
how 
these 
were 
resolved. 
Marks & 
Spencer 
Prioritiz
es risk 
assessme
nt in 
high-risk 
areas. 
Work 
with 
external 
experts 
to map 
business 
operatio
ns and 
supply 
chain to 
scope 
No 
country 
specific 
assessme
nt 
performe
d. 
Identifie
d global 
key 
issues 
followin
g from 
risk 
assessme
nt. No 
country 
specific 
risks 
commun
icated. 
Assessm
ent 
methods 
that 
focus on 
underlyi
ng 
issues; 
specific 
policies 
for 
context-
specific 
risks; 
Consider
s both 
likelihoo
d and 
severity 
in 
determin
ing 
actions 
needed 
and the 
timefram
e in 
which 
these are 
to be 
impleme
Provides 
overvie
w over 
remedy 
framewo
rk, 
example
s of how 
remedies 
were 
impleme
nted and 
how it 
aims to 
improve 
remedies  
Engages 
with 
governm
ent and 
stakehol
ders to 
resolve 
complex 
issues. 
Yearly 
sustaina
bility 
report. 
Includes 
limited 
informat
ion on 
human 
rights. 
Last 
Human 
Rights 
Report 
from 
May 
2016. 
Does not 
publicly 
disclose 
non-
complia
nce 
issues, 
how 
these 
were 
resolved, 
or audit 
results 
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and 
assess 
risks. 
nted. 
MC 
Group 
Does not 
specify 
when 
enhance
d risk 
assessme
nt is 
necessar
y and 
how this 
should 
be 
carried 
out 
No 
country 
specific 
assessme
nt for 
Myanma
r 
Does not 
identify 
specific 
human 
rights 
risks  
No clear 
policies. 
Only 
states 
the 
company 
must 
ensure 
adequate 
planning 
and 
measure
s. 
Indicates 
prioritiza
tion, but 
not what 
issues 
qualify 
and what 
actions 
would 
follow. 
Insuffici
ent 
Not 
specified  
No 
sustaina
bility 
reports 
Does not 
disclose 
any non-
complia
nce 
issues or 
auditing 
results. 
Claims 
that 
there 
were no 
violation
s in 2019 
Primark Does not 
specify 
when 
enhance
d risk 
assessme
nt is 
necessar
y and 
how this 
should 
be 
carried 
out 
Underto
ok a due 
diligence 
process 
prior to 
entering 
the 
Myanma
r market 
to assess 
potential 
and 
actual 
risk 
within 
the 
proposed 
supply 
chain. 
Global 
priorities 
only. 
These do 
no 
demonst
rate an 
awarene
ss of 
heighten
ed risks 
for 
conflict-
affected 
areas. 
Few 
addition
al 
policies, 
mainly 
on 
structura
l 
integrity. 
Does not 
specify 
how it 
aims to 
mitigate 
context-
specific 
risks or 
support 
suppliers
. 
Does not 
categoriz
e 
accordin
g to 
severity 
and 
prioritize 
accordin
gly  
Only 
states 
offer 
training 
and 
support. 
Working 
on a new 
remedy 
procedur
e, no 
informat
ion 
disclose
d.  
Not 
specified  
Yes, 
yearly 
report 
Disclose
s overall 
performa
nce of 
all 
suppliers 
but no 
informat
ion on 
kinds of 
violation
s,  where 
these 
occur, 
and how 
they are 
resolved.  
 
